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While there is a broad literature on the general wage eﬀect of training, little is known
about the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of training and about the eﬀects for heterogeneous
training participants. This study therefore adds two aspects to the literature on earnings
eﬀects of training. First, the earnings eﬀect of training is calculated for diﬀerent “types” of
employees, i.e. discriminating between qualiﬁcation level, experience, job tenure, and other
personal and employer attributes. Second, we distinguish between the earnings impact of
diﬀerent training forms. For our analysis, we use the “Qualiﬁcation and Career survey”,
a rich German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
Germany in 1998/1999. We use a one-step full information maximum likelihood and a two-
stage least squares estimation to regress the impact of training participation on earnings.
Hereby, we correct for the endogeneity of training participation using external instrumental
variables. By additionally using a broad list of employee and employer characteristics, we
try to avoid omitted variable bias.
We ﬁnd that the impact of participation in training on income is signiﬁcantly positive.
Training comprises any of the following: courses and seminars, participation in trade fairs,
lectures, on-the-job training, quality circles, special tasks, and reading of specialist litera-
ture. Correcting for the endogeneity bias, the average treatment eﬀect increases from 0.10
to 0.15. The eﬀe c to ft r a i n i n go ne a r n i n g sd i ﬀers for heterogeneous agents. High-skilled
workers proﬁt more from training than low-skilled workers, job entrants obtain a higher
earnings increase after participation in training than workers with a long job tenure, and
workers with a temporary contract proﬁt less from training than those with a permanent
job contract.
T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ei n c o m ee ﬀects of training if endogeneity is taken into account,
compared with the case where selection is assumed to be random, suggests that our in-
strumental variables reduce the measurement error in the OLS regression and capture het-
erogeneous training returns more properly. This is plausible because our dummy variable
for training inadequately captures training intensity and training eﬀort. The alternative
possibility for this phenomenon, a negative selection into training, seems unlikely given
previous empirical evidence that training is seldomly remedial.
A factor analysis shows that our seven continuing vocational training types are highly
correlated and only two factors are independent. These factors can be labelled “external”
for participation at trade fairs, lectures, courses and seminars, and reading of specialist
literature and “internal training” for on the job training, quality circles, and special tasks.
Without controlling for endogeneity, external training has a signiﬁcant positive impact
on wages, while the wage eﬀect of internal training is insigniﬁcant. Taking endogeneity
into account and instrumenting the decision to participate in internal or external training,
the coeﬃcient of external training rises from 0.05 to 0.13, while internal training stays
insigniﬁcant.The Impact of Training on Earnings - Diﬀerences between
Participant Groups and Training Forms∗
Anja Kuckulenz and Thomas Zwick
ZEW Mannheim
September 16, 2003
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While there is a broad literature on the general wage eﬀect of training, little is known
about the eﬀects of diﬀerent training forms and about the eﬀects for heterogeneous training
participants. This study therefore adds two aspects to the literature on earnings eﬀects
of training. First, the earnings eﬀect of training is calculated for diﬀerent “types” of
employees, i.e. discriminating between qualiﬁcation level, experience, job tenure, and
other attributes. Second, we distinguish between the earnings impact of external and
internal training. For our analysis, we use the “Qualiﬁcation and Career survey”, a rich
German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in Germany in
1998/1999. We use a one-step full-information maximum likelihood and a two stage least
squares estimation to regress the impact of training participation on earnings correcting for
the endogeneity of training participation. By using a broad list of employee and employer
characteristics, we try to avoid omitted variable bias. We ﬁnd the training earnings mark-
up to be positively correlated with qualiﬁcation and experience. The analysis of internal
and external training reveals that this result is driven by external training only. Internal
training does not have a signiﬁcant earnings eﬀect. The correction for selection into
training leads to an increase in the training coeﬃcients and a decrease of its signiﬁcance.
JEL classiﬁcation: C31, J24, J31
Key words: continuing training, returns to training, endogeneity, employee heterogene-
ity, training forms1 Introduction
According to the seminal work by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), individual variation
in wages and increasing wage proﬁles can be explained by diﬀerences in human capital and
by skill increases induced by experience and continuing vocational training. Training after
entering the labor force constitutes a major part of human capital investments (Heckman,
1999). If the investment is proﬁtable, returns are higher than direct and indirect costs of
training. The rent from the investment in human capital can be captured by the employer,
by the employee or will be shared between the two parties.1 This depends, above all, on
who has paid for the training and on the bargaining power of employer and employee.
A large microeconomic literature analyzes the impact of continuing vocational training
investment on productivity and a small literature discusses the rent distribution. The
empirical literature can be separated in two parts, depending on the data used. With
ﬁrm data, the impact of training on productivity and proﬁt is investigated, with employee
data, the eﬀect of training on wages is estimated. This paper adds to the latter strand
of the literature. Its special emphasis is on the heterogeneity of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
training types and of diﬀerent groups of training participants in Germany.
In studies on the impact of training on wages, usually training incidence is measured
and not the kind or speciﬁcity of training. Only some authors diﬀerentiate between on-
the-job and oﬀ-the-job training (Lynch, 1992; Pischke, 2001), employer provided and not
employer provided training (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999), formal and non-formal
training (Pfeiﬀer and Reize, 2001) and, following Becker, between general and speciﬁc
training (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1997). Assuming that turnover costs do not exist,
the wage eﬀects of general and speciﬁc training should diﬀer. Firm-speciﬁct r a i n i n gd o e s
not increase the productivity of workers in other jobs, and therefore no wage increase is
necessary to keep the worker in the present job. In contrast, general training increases
the productivity of a worker in at least one other job. Therefore, employees may proﬁt
from general training by increased wages. As a consequence, it can be assumed that the
impact of training on wages depends on the degree of speciﬁcity of the training received
(Lynch, 1992 or Blundell et al., 1999). In practice, it is not trivial to distinguish between
general and speciﬁc training, however, since continuing vocational training often comprises
both (Booth and Snower, 1996, chapter 3). Lazear (2002) argues that there is no ﬁrm-
speciﬁc training; it is only the composition of the skills needed which is speciﬁct oﬁrms.
The classiﬁcations “on-the-job” and “oﬀ-the-job”, “employer provided” and “not employer
provided” and “non-formal” and “formal training” are usually motivated as proxies for
training with more ﬁrm-speciﬁc elements (on-the-job, employer provided and non-formal)
and more general training (oﬀ-the-job, not employer provided and formal), which is easier
portable between jobs. Overall, empirical studies ﬁnd that training measures with higher
general contents have a stronger productivity eﬀect than training measures with higher
1If externalities exist, also other agents (e.g. consumer, other employees, other ﬁrms) can proﬁtf r o m
the investment.
1ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o n t e n t s . 2 The empirical evidence is not clear cut as can be seen in table 9
and will be discussed later.
Not only the type of training may have an impact on earnings, but also the type of
training participant. Heckman (1999) suggests that trainability increases with qualiﬁcation
a n dt e n u r ea n dt h a tt h ee ﬀect of training on productivity is larger for higher educated
employees. Therefore, it can be assumed that the qualiﬁcation level and tenure as well as
maybe other characteristics might have an impact on the returns to training. Nevertheless,
only few empirical studies discriminate between the wage eﬀect for diﬀerent groups of
employees by estimating separate regressions for each group. Lynch (1992) calculates the
training impact of diﬀerent training types separately for diﬀerent education groups, gender,
and unionized versus non-unionized workers. Pannenberg (1998) uses interaction terms of
training and company tenure dummies and experience dummies to diﬀerentiate the impact
of training on income between employees with diﬀerent company tenure and experience.
He reports that wage eﬀects of training are highest for job entrants. Lynch (1992) ﬁnds
that the wage impact of training can be even negative for less educated employees, and
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996) ﬁnd that returns to training are highest for middle
or highly educated individuals.
Finally, there is wide agreement that the group of employees participating in training
is diﬀerent from the group that does not with respect to unobservable characteristics
(Heckman, 1999; Card, 1999) . Employers might tend to oﬀer training only to those
individuals who are more trainable, while better motivated individuals may be more likely
to pursue oﬀ-the-job training (Lynch, 1992). Bartel (1995) ﬁnds for technical and core
training3 that individuals whose salaries are higher than those of comparable individuals in
the same ﬁrms have a higher probability to attend training.4 Other authors also argue that
those individuals who are on a career path with rapidly growing income are more likely
to participate in training (Pannenberg, 1997; Pfeiﬀer and Reize, 2001; Pischke, 2001).
Therefore, adequate instrumental variables have to be found that explain the selection
into training participation to correct for treatment selection.
This study mainly adds two new aspects to the literature on earnings eﬀects of train-
ing. First, we show that the earnings eﬀect of training varies between diﬀerent “types”
of employees, i.e. discriminating between qualiﬁcation level, experience, job tenure, and
many other attributes. Second, we distinguish between the impact of internal and external
training measures on earnings. In both cases, the endogeneity of training participation
2Some authors have also analysed employment eﬀects of diﬀerent training types. As Fitzenberger
and Prey (1997) show for East Germany, training outside of the ﬁrm has a strong negative impact on
employment probabilities, while training in the ﬁrrm has a positive eﬀect.
3“Core” training is mainly management and leadership training, development training mainly entails
presentation and communication workshops and management techniques, while technical programs include
project management, statistics, quality control, and computer programming.
4Hence, she labels these types of training as career advancement training. Development training is
r e m e d i a l ,h o w e v e r ,i . e .t h el o w e ra ni n d i v i d u a l ’ sr e l a t i v ew a g es t a t u s ,t h em o r el i k e l yh eo rs h ei st or e c e i v e
this type of training.
2is corrected by using instrumental variables. For our analysis, we use a rich and repre-
sentative German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
1998/1999 - the BIBB/IAB data set “Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey”.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical background
and our econometric methods are brieﬂy discussed. Then, we present the data set and
the variables used. This is followed by the empirical evidence, where we ﬁrst present
some descriptive statistics. Second, we estimate the eﬀect of training on the earnings of
heterogeneous participants in training, and third we distinguish between the wage eﬀects
of internal and external training. After that, we compare our results to the ﬁndings of
the literature based on individual as well as on ﬁrm data. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of our results and an outlook for further research.
2 Background Discussion
In order to explain earnings, economists traditionally use the so-called Mincer equation,
a standard tool in human capital theory. Here, earnings are explained by schooling,
experience, experience-squared, and a constant5:
lnY = µ0 + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + e, (1)
where ln Y is the natural logarithm of earnings, S schooling, EX experience, EX2
experience-squared, and µ0 a constant. The error term is labelled e ∼N(0, σ2). Experience
enters also as a squared term in order to allow earnings to increase with experience with
a decreasing rate. In the standard Mincer equation, the growth of earnings over working
life, i.e. the experience wage proﬁle, reﬂects workers returns to investments in human
capital and seniority wages (Franz, 2003). As Mincer puts it: “The human capital earnings
function contains, among other variables, years of (work) experience, (...), which enters in a
nonlinear fashion. Its coeﬃcients are interpretable as postschool human capital investment
parameters” (Mincer, 1991, p. 32). This means, however, that postschool human capital
investments are proxied here by work experience or, in other words, left as a black box.
In order to open the black box, we use a dummy for continuing vocational training T as
an additional explanatory factor for earnings:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + e. (2)
5A theoretical derivation of the standard Mincer equation from earnings deﬁned by earnings capacity
minus training investments is provided by Franz (2003). Recently, Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003)
have examined the theoretical foundations and empirical support for the Mincer earnings regression.
3Adding information on training to the basic Mincer earnings equation should take
away some of the explanatory power of the coeﬃcients of work experience. Our data set
allows us to capture part of the observable individual heterogeneity left in standard Mincer
equations by using a large variety of additional explanatory variables, X, such as workplace
characteristics, professional career and personal characteristics of the employee6:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X + e. (3)
In the introduction, we argued that the earnings impact of training may crucially
depend on the kind of training the employees receive and also on characteristics of the
training participants. Therefore, we include a full set of interaction terms between training
and employee characteristics in order to allow for group-speciﬁc returns to training. This
speciﬁcation, suggested by Wooldridge (2002), allows us to calculate the average treatment
eﬀect of training and to show that the eﬀect on earnings varies for employees with diﬀerent
professional careers, workplace characteristics, school attainment, professional status, and
other characteristics:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X + δ1T(S − S)
+δ2T(EX − EX)+δ3T(EX2 − EX
2)+δ4T(X − X)+e. (4)
Employees who participate in training are not randomly selected. We show in the in-
troduction that unobservable employee characteristics, such as intrinsic motivation, career
orientation or social behavior, inﬂuence both, earnings and training participation. There-
fore, the impact of training included as a dummy variable in an OLS earnings equation
tends to be biased, because the error term of the earnings equation might be correlated
with the probability of receiving company training. To consider the eﬀect of an endoge-
nously chosen binary treatment (training), we estimate a treatment eﬀect model that is
conditional on two sets of independent variables explaining ln Y and T. The treatment
equation measures the unobserved net beneﬁt to the individual and employer from pro-
viding training, T∗. Assuming that ﬁrms oﬀer training only if the net beneﬁti sp o s i t i v e ,
we ﬁnd:
T∗ = Zg+ u>0( 5 )
T =1 i f T∗ > 0
T =0 i f T∗ ≤ 0,
where Z is a vector of individual and employer characteristics not included in X, deter-
mining whether an individual takes part in training or not, and the error term u ∼N(0,1),
6Bartel (1995) includes objective measures of ﬁrm performance and information about the relative wage
status of the individual (compared to other employees in the same job) to eliminate the heterogeneity bias
in the estimation of the impact of training on wages and job performance.
4corr(e,u)=ρ.I fZ indicates participation in training, we estimate by IV, using as instru-
ments constant, Z,S,EX,EX2,X, and interactions of Z with all demeaned covariates.
For consistency, we must assume that the covariance conditional on (S,EX,EX2,X,Z)
is constant, which might not be exactly but approximately true (Wooldridge, 2002).
Most data sets do not provide suitable additional variables that meet the requirements
for qualifying them as identifying variables in an instrument regression. In the case of panel
data, lagged values or diﬀerences of the explaining variable in question are often used as
instruments.7 This strategy is problematic, however, because the instruments are often
only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. Therefore, it is preferable to use
external instruments z that intuitively explain the selection process in the establishment
and are correlated with training incidence but not with earnings (Griliches and Mairesse,
1998).
The one-step full-information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) is based on the
entire system of equations and treats all equations and all parameters jointly. With nor-
mally distributed disturbances, the estimator is more eﬃcient than the two stage least
squares (2SLS) estimator. To test the robustness of our speciﬁc a t i o n ,w eu s eb o t h ,F I M L
and Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator. Our preferred estimation equation therefore
contains the instrumented training coeﬃcient:
lnY = µ0 + αb T∗ + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1 b T∗(S − S)+δ2 b T∗(EX − EX)
+δ3 b T∗(EX2 − EX
2)+δ4 b T∗(X − X)+e, (6)
where b T∗ is the estimated participation in training from (5).
In order to take heterogeneity in the wage eﬀect of diﬀerent training types into account,
we additionally diﬀerentiate between training forms. A factor analysis (see below) shows
that there are two independent bundles of training forms that can intuitively be labelled:
internal training, Ti, and external training, Te. Analogously to the approach described
above, we estimate:
lnY = µ0 + α1Ti + α2Te + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1Ti(s − s)+δ2Ti(EX − EX)+δ3Ti(EX2 − EX
2)
+δ4Ti(X − X)+δ1Te(S − S)+δ2Te(EX − EX)
+δ3Te(EX2 − EX
2)+δ4Te(X − X)+e. (7)
7Lynch (1992), for example, uses “somewhat artiﬁcial exclusions of explanatory variables” (p. 309) in
order to cure the endogeneity of training participation, while Goux and Maurin (2000) use time lags for
identiﬁcation.
5When distinguishing between internal and external training in the second part of the
empirical analysis, we again account for the endogeneity of training by using external
instrumental variables, Z, analogously to the model presented above.
lnY = µ0 + α1 b T∗
i + α2 b T∗
e + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1 b T∗
i (S − S)+δ2 b T∗
i (EX − EX)+δ3 b T∗
i (EX2 − EX
2)
+δ4 b T∗
i (X − X)+δ1 b T∗
e (S − S)+δ2 b T∗
e (EX − EX)
+δ3 b T∗
e (EX2 − EX
2)+δ4 b T∗
e (X − X)+e, (8)
where b T∗
i and b T∗
e are the jointly estimated probabilities to participate in external or
internal training.
The quintessence of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the impact of training
on earnings depends on employee and workplace characteristics and also on the type of
training. In the following section, the data and variables we use for the empirical estimation
are described.
3D a t a
In order to analyze the impact of training on earnings empirically, we use a rich data
set, compiled from a representative sample of 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
Germany. The BIBB/IAB “Qualiﬁcation and Career survey” (“Beruﬂiche Qualiﬁkation
und Erwerbsarbeit”) is jointly ascertained by the Research Institute of the Federal Labor
Oﬃce (Institut f¨ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB N¨ urnberg) and the Federal
Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut f¨ ur Berufsbildung, BIBB Berlin). The
survey is implemented every seven years, but it is not a panel. We will use the latest wave
available, which is from the survey in 1998/99. It comprises more than 34.000 employees.
The cross-section data on employed individuals in Germany contain detailed information
on the qualiﬁcation and the professional career of each individual, the organizational and
technological environment of jobs, and the qualiﬁcations demanded for jobs. Furthermore,
information about the employer and some personal attributes are included. Speciﬁcally,
we use the following variables (see also table A1 in the appendix for the complete list with
detailed descriptions and table A11 for a German translation of selected variables):
6• The endogenous variable is log midpoints of earnings from 18 categories.8
• The key explanatory variable is participation in training during the last two years.
On the one hand, it is asked whether the individual participated in courses or semi-
nars. On the other hand, participation in diﬀerent training categories is ascertained,
such as participation in fairs, lectures, on-the-job training, speciﬁc company training,
or taking over special tasks as well as reading technical literature.9 By combining
both questions, we obtain a dummy for participation in training. In addition, we
selected those six speciﬁc training forms mentioned above from the second question
plus participation in courses and seminars in order to calculate the diﬀerent wage
eﬀect of these training forms. An important measurement problem of our training
variables is that they do not include information on the length and costs of the
training attended.
• Furthermore, individuals were asked to state in which speciﬁc ﬁelds they need further
training. This information will be used for our external identifying variables for the
participation in training courses, because it will be shown that these variables are
correlated with training but not with wages.
• The second set of external identifying variables originates from questions on the
changes in the workplace, such as downsizing or restructuring.
• Further explanatory variables are those found in the Mincer equation from the pro-
fessional life, i.e. actual work experience10, job tenure, former unemployment, and
dummies for the highest educational achievement.
• Along with these standard variables, we also include some dummies capturing the
professional status, such as blue-collar or white-collar worker, civil servant or diﬀer-
ent sophistication levels of tasks.
• In addition, we use the following job characteristics: computer use, proﬁt-sharing,
bonus payments, overtime work, whether a job is temporary, and main job contents.
8The ﬁrst category includes all earnings below 600 DM, the second includes earnings from 600 DM
until 1,000 DM. The following categories comprise earnings intervals of 500 DM up to 6,000 DM. From
6,000 DM to earnings of 10,000 DM, the intervals are in steps of 1,000 DM. The next category comprises
earnings from 10,000 DM until 15,000 DM and the last category includes all earnings of 15,000 DM, and
above. Most earnings can be found in the categories between 3,000 DM and 5,000 DM, see table A1 in the
appendix for descriptive statistics.
9There are two questions on the participation in continuing training. First, “Please think about the
last ﬁve years, i.e. the time from 1994 until today. Did you attend during this time any seminars or
courses which serve your continuous process of education?” Here, only those workers who participated
in training during the last two years are included. Second, “Which of the following possibilities to take
part in continuous training did you use during the last two years, i.e. from the beginning of 1997 onward,
in order to aquire additional knowledge?” Here, eight training categories are included. We chose not to
use two of these categories, “internship” and “other kinds of training”, because it is unclear what kind of
training on the job is behind these variables.
10We have information about the time when the job market was entered, and we include dummies for
discontinuations like unemployment or maternity leave.
7These variables allow us to control a large part of the individual heterogeneity be-
tween the employees.11 Some of these variables (for example working overtime) can
be interpreted as indicators for intrinsic motivation.
• Additional control variables explaining earnings are personal attributes. We include
a dummy for children and German nationality.
• Finally, we also control for the size of community the individual lives in and the ﬁrm
size. Dummies for German states (“L¨ ander”) and dummies indicating the economic
sector of the employer are included.
Only employees in West Germany are included, because in 1998 there were still large
diﬀerences in the labor market structures of the two parts of the country.12 The analysis
is restricted to male employees, because the data do not allow us to model participation
in the labor market simultaneously, which would be important for examining earnings
eﬀects for women. Hours worked vary widely in the data and we found a number of
implausibly high reported values. Therefore, we only use full-time13 employees and do not
take reported working hours into account.14
In order to obtain clean evidence on the earnings eﬀects of employee training, we
include only those workers who received training from their current employer. This means
that we exclude all employees who have participated in training during the last two years
and changed the employer during this period. The reason for this restriction in our sample
is that our data do not give information whether training was provided by an employer
or whether it was sponsored by the government and aimed at unemployed. Fitzenberger
and Speckesser (2000) note that the eﬀects of training sponsored by the government for
unemployed and training paid by private enterprises should be analyzed separately.
Before turning to the estimation of our extended Mincer equation, the speciﬁcity of
the data has to be taken into account. In our data set, the information on income is
given in interval-coded data, i.e. the income is registered by 18 narrow intervals (see the
description above). In order to estimate the earnings equation consistently, we therefore
need to make a distributional assumption. On the one hand, we can use an interval
regression which estimates the coeﬃcients and variances by maximum likelihood, such as
ordered probit with ﬁxed cut points. The coeﬃcients can be interpreted here as if we
had observed the exact income for each individual and estimated the earnings regression
by OLS. The underlying assumption which allows us to use the ordered probit estimator
is that earnings, given the set of explanatory variables, satisfys the assumptions of the
11Some of these variables may also be endogenous in the earnings equation. We do not control this,
however, because the variables mainly serve as control variables for employee heterogeneity.
12See Gang and Yun (2002) or Riphahn (2001).
13We include only employees working 30 hours and above per week. Only 2.6 percent of the males work
less than 30 hours. Also, we use a dummy for working overtime in order to take hours worked into account.
14The results do not change qualitatively, however, if we use log hourly wages instead of log earnings as
the dependent variable.
8classical linear regression model. We take log earnings as cell limits because earnings are
strictly positive (Wooldridge, 2002). On the other hand, we can employ an OLS regression,
simply taking the log of the mean value of each earnings category. Here, we assume that on
average individual earnings in one category are the mean value of this interval. We do not
ﬁnd any diﬀerences in coeﬃcients between exploratory interval and OLS regressions. In
addition, the t-values of the OLS regression are very close to those of the interval regression
and the standard errors only slightly deviate (the estimation results for these robustness
checks are presented in table A2 in the appendix). For convenience and since the results
are not inﬂuenced by the estimation method used, we will take the log midpoints of the
earnings categories and estimate the earnings equation with OLS techniques instead of
using maximum likelihood methods in the following analysis (see also Pfeiﬀer and Reize,
2001).
4 Empirical Evidence
This section consists of three parts. First, we present some descriptive statistics and show
some robustness tests to introduce the data set. In the second part, the earnings eﬀect
of a training dummy is evaluated. And third, we estimate the earnings eﬀect of diﬀerent
training types.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In table 1, participation in seven diﬀerent training forms are shown for full-time working
men. In total, 55 percent of males participated in some kind of training. As any kind
of training within two years is included here, this data set reports higher participation in
training than other German data sets.15 Relying on the German SOEP, Pischke (2001)
for example reports that 31 percent of employed males participated in any training in
1986. Participation rates of males in our selected training forms diﬀer between 13 and
26 percent.16 About 13 percent of the males report to be assigned to jobs including
special tasks in order to extend their skills and gain experience and 14 percent participate
in quality circles. Around 17 percent of the male full-time workers obtain on-the-job
training, 18 percent attend trade fairs, and 26 percent attend seminars and presentations
on speciﬁc topics or read technical literature.
15According to the German ministry of education and research, “Bundesministerium f¨ ur Bildung und
Forschung (BMBF)”, no uniform statistics on training exist. There are several oﬃcial sources (Mikrozensus,
SOEP, IAB-Betriebspanel, CVTS, and IW-Erhebung) reporting diﬀerent numbers (Kuwan et al., 2003).
16For all types of training, we observe a larger attendance of men than of women. This diﬀerence in
participation of women and men becomes much stronger when we include also part-time workers which
are mostly women.
9As can be seen from the correlation matrix in the appendix (table A3), individuals
often take part in several kinds of training, and therefore some training forms are highly
correlated with each other. Speciﬁcally, those employees reading technical literature are
rather likely to visit also trade fairs and to attend seminars and presentations. This
means that we cannot discern the earnings inﬂuences of all individual training measures.
A factor analysis allows the separation of independent factors underlying the individual
training forms, however. The factor analysis in table 2 reports that the 7 categories of
training can be divided into two independent factors with eigen values above 1. These two
factors explain 52 percent of the total variation. We can intuitively distinguish between
internal training, including participation in on-the-job training, company programs, and
the assignment of special tasks, and external training, including courses and seminars,
the visit of trade fairs, the attendance of seminars, and reading of specialist literature.
Tentatively, we argue that internal training has a higher share of speciﬁc training content
in comparison to our external training measures.
Table 1: Participation in Training
Type of Training
Men in % 
N=9800







Any Kind of Training 55.43
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own 
calculations.
Table 2: Rotated Component Matrixa of Factor Analysis: Types of Training




1: External Training 2.54 Trade Fair 0.78 (-0.22)
Lecture 0.81 (-0.01)
Specialist Literature 0.76 (-0.00)
Courses and Seminars 0.61 (0.20)
2: Internal Training 1.07 On-The-Job 0.81 (-0.19)
Quality Circle 0.55 (0.14)
Special Tasks 0.53 (0.19)
Notes: 
a The factors have been rotated by promax.
b In the brackets, you find the factor loading of the factor not chosen.
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Participation in training also depends on the qualiﬁcation of the employee. In table
3, the attendance of any kind of training is sorted by qualiﬁcation. Analogously to the
10literature (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996; Heckman, 1999; Pischke, 2001; Pfeiﬀer
and Brade, 1995), we ﬁnd that individuals with higher education participate more often in
training, and private sector training mainly excludes low-skilled persons. This applies to
school attainment as well as to professional or vocational training. Attendance in training
of employees without a professional degree is lowest, only 28 percent have participated in
some kind of training. In contrast, 85 percent and more of the employees with a university
degree have taken part in continuing vocational training during the last two years.
Table 3: Participation in Training (sorted by qualiﬁcation)
Education Men in %
N = 9800
Without School Leaving Certificate 39,88
Lower Secondary School 42,69
Intermediate Secondary School 62,31
Entrance Examination for University for Applied 
Sciences
81,64
High School Diploma 78,60
Without Professional Degree 27,88
Full-Time Vocational School 51,15
Apprenticeship 50,45
Master Craftman 76,60
University for Applied Sciences 87,31
University 84,96
Total 55,43




In order to check the robustness of our results with respect to the speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst
estimate a slightly modiﬁed Mincer equation, with log earnings as the endogenous variable
and including experience, experience-squared and a set of dummy variables, indicating
primary and secondary education as controlling variables. The results of the Mincer
equation are in line with similar studies for Germany (see Franz, 2003).17 As expected,
income is higher for workers with more experience, but it increases at a decreasing rate
since the coeﬃcient for experience-squared is negative. With more school attainment and
higher professional degrees, income increases (compare table A4).
As expected, adding the training dummies to the basic earnings equation takes away
some of the explanatory power of the coeﬃcients of work experience and decreases the
coeﬃcients of the school attainment and professional degree dummies. The coeﬃcients
of the education variables decrease in the extended Mincer equation, because training re-
places some of the knowledge or adds to what has been learned in school and professional
17Even though the estimations in Franz (2003, chapter 3) are based on a pooled sample (1984 - 1993)
from the German SOEP, coeﬃcients and t-values are very close to our results.
11education. If we diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent training forms, the coeﬃcient of training
on the job is the only training variable with a negative, albeit insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, all
others are positive. The additional information on investments in human capital increases
the adjusted R2 of the OLS regression from 32 to 38 percent. With a large number of
variables controlling for ﬁrm and job characteristics and some other attributes, the coef-
ﬁcients of experience and experience-squared are unchanged but their t-values decrease.
In addition, the coeﬃcients of school attainment, vocational training, and continuing vo-
cational training dummies as well as their t-values decrease. Here, the adjusted R2 rises
to 50 percent, indicating that the variables controlling for workplace and personal charac-
teristics, professional career, professional status, and other attributes uncover part of the
sample heterogeneity, which is unobserved in the standard Mincer equation (see tables A4
and A5 in the appendix).
4.2 Earnings Eﬀect of Training Participation
In this section, we present our estimation results on the eﬀect of participation in training
during the previous two years on earnings. We ﬁnd that training signiﬁcantly increases
earnings on average by ﬁve percentage points, see table A6. It is well-known from the lit-
erature that training participants diﬀer from those employees who do not receive training.
In order to validate this, we use a Chow test for the equality of the two sets of coeﬃcients
in linear wage regression models, to check whether the coeﬃcients diﬀer between partici-
pants and non-participants in training. As suggested by Card (1999), the test reveals that
participants and non-participants not only diﬀer in their earnings but also in several other
aspects, and therefore the earnings equations should be estimated separately for training
participants and non-participants.18 Another alternative is to add interaction terms of
the training dummy with all covariates. The inclusion of a full set of interaction terms
allows us to estimate one wage regression for both groups in this speciﬁcation, since a joint
estimation of separate coeﬃcients of participants and non-participants for all covariates
is possible. The results of the wage equation including the interaction variables can be
seen in table A7 in the appendix. The average treatment eﬀect, i.e. the wage eﬀect for
an employee with reference characteristics (all dummies are zero), with mean professional
experience (22 years) and mean tenure in the ﬁrm (14 years) is 6 percent. Therefore,
earnings are on average by 6 percentage points higher for participants in training than
for non-participants according to this speciﬁcation. Depending on the qualiﬁcation of the
individual and some job attributes, the impact of training on earnings is higher or lower
than the average treatment eﬀect, however. We will discuss in detail below that high qual-
iﬁed and experienced employees proﬁt much more from training than low-skilled workers
just entering the labor market.
In order to evaluate the impact of training on earnings properly, we have to take the
18The test statistic is: F(110, 8103) = 2.83 Prob > F = 0.0000.
12endogeneity of training into account. We instrument the training dummy and estimate a
treatment eﬀect model using one-step full information maximum likelihood. The determi-
nants of participation are shown in the probit equation (table 4). Investments in human
capital tend to be greater when (1) the expected earnings are greater, (2) the initial in-
vestment costs are lower, and (3) the investor has longer time to recoup the investment
(Heckman, 1999). People with the ability to learn quickly are more likely to seek out and
be presented by employers with learning opportunities. They are usually people who, be-
cause of their abilities, were best able to reap the beneﬁts of formal schooling. This implies
that those who invested more in schooling are likely to invest more in post-school training.
In the literature on participation in training, besides years of schooling, ﬁrm size, length
of job tenure, work experience, part-time working, unionization, and the level of technol-
o g yu s e di nt h ei n d u s t r yh a v eb e e nf o u n da sm a i nd e t e r m i n a n t s( B o o t h ,F r a n c e s c o n ia n d
Zoega, 2003; Gerlach and Jirjahn, 1998; Lynch and Black, 1998; Mincer, 1991; Pfeiﬀer and
Brade, 1995; Pfeiﬀer and Reize, 2001; Shields, 1998; Goux and Maurin, 2000). We also
ﬁnd these variables to be crucial: highly skilled employees and also those employees who
work with a personal computer and in larger ﬁrms receive training more often than oth-
ers. Additionally, we calculate the probability to attend training depending on experience
and ﬁrm tenure and thereby conﬁrm the result of Pfeiﬀer and Reize (2001): employees
attend continuing vocational training more frequently with a longer company tenure (but
on a decreasing scale). With more work experience, participation in training decreases,
it is highest for job entrants (see ﬁgure A1 in the appendix). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
employees who work overtime or who receive incentive wages participate more often in
training. These variables may be indicators for intrinsic motivation of the employee which
may also be positively correlated with training incidence (Heckman, 1999). Participa-
tion probability increases with the professional status while employees with non-German
nationality generally obtain continuing vocational training less frequently. Regional and
sectoral labor market conditions are captured by 10 dummies for German states and 46
dummies for the economic sectors.
Our external identifying variables which determine participation in training but are
uncorrelated with earnings are, ﬁrst, the subjective need for speciﬁc training types. This
especially applies to the need for training in job-speciﬁca r e a s ,s u c ha sp r e s e n t a t i o nt e c h -
niques, management topics, computer technology or ﬁnance. A greater need for these
training forms indicates that individuals have already participated. If, persons have a
need for training in general topics, however, such as mathematics, they have less frequently
participated in training during the last two years. This suggests that these individuals
have also had a need for basic training in the past but that ﬁrms are not willing to provide
this kind of training (Heckman, 1999). Our second set of external identifying variables
indicates whether any restructuring has been taken place in the ﬁrm, such as downsizing
or restructuring of the workplace.
13Table 4: Selection into Training - Endogenous Variable: Training Dummy
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Mathematics -0.17 (-1.81) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.14 (2.66) ***
German -0.00 (-0.04)  Assistant Foreman 0.37 (3.99) ***
System Engineering 0.18 (1.71) * Master/Foreman 0.32 (3.06) ***
Computer Engineering 0.11 (1.72) * Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.11 (1.13) 
Other Engineering 0.38 (0.62) *** White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
0.12 (1.44) 
Safety at Work 0.11 (1.85) *
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.37 (5.68) ***
Medicine 0.23 (1.91) * High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.55 (8.01) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.45 (4.66) ***
Downsizing 0.03 (0.54)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.33 (3.30) ***
Restructuring 0.15 (2.97) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.76 (5.81) ***
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.97 (5.45) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.02 (-0.21)  Computer Work Station 0.25 (6.29) ***
Lower Secondary School -0.06 (-1.61)  Temporary Work -0.27 (-3.56) ***
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Overtime 0.15 (4.17) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences
0.09 (1.21)  Incentive Wage 0.17 (4.44) ***
High School Diploma -0.11 (-1.66) *
Without Professional Degree -0.10 (-1.01)  Children 0.12 (3.73) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Foreigner -0.16 (-2.45) **
Apprenticeship 0.05 (0.54) 
Master Craftman 0.28 (2.64) *** Number of Observations 9723
University for Applied Sciences 0.27 (2.20) ** LR chi2 (130) 2667.44
University 0.24 (1.89) * Pseudo R2 0.2834
Professional Experience -0.00 (-0.13) 
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.52) 
Company Tenure 0.04 (7.67) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-6.08) ***
Unemployment 0.06 (1.60) 
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Changes in the Workplace
Vocational Training
Professional Career
Professional Status Identifying Variables
Training Needs
Education and Continuous Training
It is well known that ﬁrms oﬀer more training after restructuring (Acemoglu and Pis-
chke, 1999; Zwick, 2004). Therefore, participation in training is higher if restructuring
has taken place in a ﬁrm. The results of the treatment wage regression are given in table
5. The standard variables in the earnings equation have again the expected coeﬃcients:
earnings increase with professional experience on a decreasing scale and with higher pro-
fessional degrees and higher professional status. School attainment variables have the
expected coeﬃcients but are, except for high school diploma, insigniﬁcant.19 Employees
have higher earnings when they work overtime, obtain proﬁt-sharing and incentive wages.
The average treatment eﬀect of training is a 15 percentage points diﬀerence in earnings
19The insigniﬁcance can be due to multicollineary with other covariates or it shows that for employees
who do not participate in training, schooling does not have an impact on earnings.
14for participants versus non-participants.20 Hence, after instrumenting for the selection
into training, the earnings eﬀect of continuing vocational training is larger than in the
OLS estimation. This result is in line with other studies (Bartel, 1995; Pischke, 2001;
Pannenberg, 1997; Pfeiﬀer and Reize, 2001).
T a b l e5 : W a g eE ﬀects of Training with Selectivity Correction - Treatment
Eﬀect Model
Training 0.15 (3.61) *** Children 0.04 (2.40) **
Foreigner -0.05 (-1.97) **
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.41 (0.99) 
Lower Secondary School 0.04 (1.65) *
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Professional Experience 0.02 (2.93) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.00 (0.01)  Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.40) 
High School Diploma 0.09 (1.88) * Company Tenure -0.02 (-4.52) ***
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (3.97) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.17 (-2.43) ** Computer Work Station 0.03 (0.76) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Temporary Work -0.10 (-1.29) 
Apprenticeship -0.05 (-0.74)  Good Economic Situation 0.07 (2.32) **
Master Craftman -0.02 (-0.28)  Overtime -0.03 (-1.06) 
University for Applied Sciences -0.02 (-0.13)  Profit-Sharing 0.11 (2.15) **
University -0.01 (-0.1)  Incentive Wage -0.05 (-1.52) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.07 (-0.92) 
Professional Experience 0.01 (1.70) * Lower Secondary School -0.11 (-3.02) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.76) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.06 (0.94) 
Company Tenure 0.02 (5.86) *** High School Diploma -0.00 (-0.05) 
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-4.28) ***
Unemployment -0.00 (-0.14)  Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.01 (0.13) 
Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-0.37) 
Master/Foreman -0.01 (-0.11) 
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.74) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.05 (1.75) *
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.14 (-1.25) 
Assistant Foreman 0.08 (1.58) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks -0.13 (-1.29) 
Master/Foreman 0.16 (2.47) ** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.15 (1.49) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.09 (2.30) ** Executive White-Collar Worker 0.18 (1.23) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
0.07 (1.57)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.17 (-1.47) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.18 (3.29) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.15 (-0.66) 
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.07 (1.23)  Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.29 (-0.77) 
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.14 (1.37) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.16 (2.42) ** Number of Observations 8325
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.22 (1.16)  Chi-squared Stat. 10577.43
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.51 (1.47) 
Computer Work Station 0.01 (0.48) 
Temporary Work -0.22 (-0.64) 
Good Economic Situation 0.00 (0.16) 
Overtime 0.06 (3.05) ***
Profit-Sharing -0.01 (-0.21) 
Incentive Wage 0.05 (2.31) **
Interaction Variables
Individual Characteristics Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 






20The two-step Heckman selection correction model gives quantitatively the same result. Here the
estimated training coeﬃcient is 18 percentage points.
15This increase in the coeﬃcient may be the consequence of three eﬀects familiar from
the returns to education literature (Card, 1999). First, there might be a negative selection
into training: individuals with lower earnings are more likely to take part in training, and
training therefore is remedial. This is contrary to most of the literature, however: Goux
and Maurin (2000) show that high-wage workers are more likely to be selected for training
than other workers. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000), in contrast, argue that the
productivity eﬀect is underestimated when treating training as exogenous since it is often
adopted in “bad times”, when productivity is low. Second, training might be measured
with errors, and the OLS earning estimation may therefore be downward biased (Griliches
and Hausman, 1986). These errors decrease by instrumenting the training variable if the
instruments capture part of the measurement errors. In our case, the training dummy is
indeed a rough measure, because a one day course has the same measure as a course that
takes several weeks. A third reason may be that the returns to training are heterogeneous21
(Card, 1999). It seems plausible that especially those employees who have a subjective need
for training or are happy with their past training experience can realize a higher income
increase after training. These employees might gain more human capital by training than
the others and therefore have a stronger productivity improvement (Harmon, Oosterbeek
and Walker, 2003). We cannot separate the impact of the individual biases on training
returns, and therefore it is unclear if training is remedial or not.
Table 6: Eﬀect of Training on Earnings for Heterogeneous Employees
Average Treatment Effect 0.15 Average Treatment Effect 0.15
Professional Experience 3* -0.30 Professional Experience 3* -0.30
Professional Experience 
Squared 90 . 0 9
Professional Experience 
Squared 90 . 0 9
Company Tenure 2* 0.24 Company Tenure 2* 0.24
Company Tenure Squared 4- 0 . 1 3 Company Tenure Squared 4 -0.13
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.06
Entrance Examination for 
University of Applied Sciences 0.06
Temporary Work -0.09 Computer Work Station 0.02
Assistant Foreman -0.04 Employee with Difficult Tasks -0.12
Effect of Training: -0.14 Effect of Training: 0.00
Average Treatment Effect 0.15 Average Treatment Effect 0.15





Company Tenure 24* -0.21 Company Tenure 24* -0.21
Company Tenure Squared 576 0.12 Company Tenure Squared 576 0.12
Lower Secondary School -0.05 High School Diploma 0.00
Low-Level Employee -0.07 Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.13
Effect of Training: 0.02 Effect of Training: 0.27
* in years
Low skilled without experience High skilled without experience
Low skilled with experience High skilled with experience
21Heterogeneous not only with respect to observable but also to unobservable characteristics.
16Some authors estimated very high training coeﬃcients with 0.4 and even above. They
explain the large size by the emphasis of the German wage bargaining system on the
acquisition of formal qualiﬁcations as a means for wage and productivity growth and state
that not training determines wages, but that those who attend training, are on a high
wage growth career path (Georgellis and Lange, 1997; Pfeiﬀer and Reize, 2001). Also,
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002) argue that a large share of these estimated coeﬃcients are
due to returns to some unobservable characteristics.
With the incorporated interaction variables, we capture part of the usually neglected
heterogeneous earnings eﬀect of training.22 The impact of training on earnings is larger
for high-skilled workers, low-skilled workers gain less from training. Heckman (1999)
stresses that more able people acquire more skills and that more skilled people become
more able. Therefore, it seems not surprising that the productivity eﬀect of training
is smaller for the less skilled who accordingly get a lower wage mark-up. Employees
w i t hal o n gw o r ke x p e r i e n c eg a i nm o r ef r o mt r a i n i n gt h a np e r s o n sw h oh a v ej u s te n t e r e d
the labor market. This might indicate that continuing vocational training refreshes or
updates primary vocational training and therefore is especially useful for older workers
whose primary education is partly obsolete. Besides the explanation that training is more
eﬀective on the job for more experienced workers, these workers are also likely to have
more bargaining power than unexperienced workers and therefore can capture a larger
share if there are rents to divide.23 As already indicated by Lazear (1979), earnings and
productivity at a given point in the career do not have to correspond. He notes that
employees may ﬁrst get wages that are lower than their productivity and at a later stage
of their professional career, they can proﬁt from early investments in their human capital.
Also, long job tenure increases participation in continuing training but diminishes the
impact of training on income. Pannenberg (1998) determines wage diﬀerentials between
participants and non-participants depending on tenure and comes to the same result. In
his estimations, the wage eﬀects are largest for the training that takes place two or three
years after entering a company. It seems plausible that the kind of training provided to
entrants in the ﬁrm increases productivity substantially since their demand for speciﬁc
training is strong. Additionally, job attributes matter for the income eﬀect of training:
workers with temporary contracts do not obtain any wage mark-up or only a very small
one, depending on their professional experience and other attributes. The reason clearly
is that employers cannot proﬁt from the increased productivity since the employees will
probably change their job soon and will share the rent from investment in human capital
with their next employer. One can even imagine that temporary workers implicitly pay
for part of their training by accepting lower earnings, because they expect this investment
in human capital to pay oﬀ l a t e ri nf o r mo fah i g h e rw a g ep a i db yt h en e x te m p l o y e r .
22In contrast to our approach to distinguish only heterogeneous returns with respect to observable
characteristics, Maier, Pfeiﬀer and Pohlmeier (2003) allow for individual heterogeneity in the returns to
schooling.
23Muysken and Zwick (2003) argue that insiders might use up-skilling in order to skim rents.
17Some examples for earnings eﬀects of training participation for diﬀerent types of em-
ployees are provided in table 6. The eﬀects are calculated from table 5 for speciﬁch e t -
erogeneous agents. The diﬀerences in earnings for participants and non-participants in
training diﬀer widely across qualiﬁcation groups, professional career and job attributes.
In the examples we deﬁned, low-skilled workers do not gain from training when they just
entered the job market and they might even have to pay for it by receiving a lower income.
Low-skilled workers with experience do not participate often, but if they attend training,
they do receive higher earnings. High-skilled workers gain from training, especially when
they have a long professional experience. Hence, heterogeneity between selected groups
of workers is important in this context and should be taken into account, not only when
estimating the selection into training but also in the earnings equation24. In addition, dif-
ferent training forms should be distinguished, which we have not done so far. In the next
section, we will therefore replace our training dummy with factors comprising diﬀerent
types of training.
4.3 Earnings Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Types of Training
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we distinguish between selected training
forms. This is an attempt to diﬀerentiate between the wage eﬀects of training forms with
more or less speciﬁcc o n t e n t s .
Table 7: Participation in Internal and External Training
Qualification Internal External 
Without School Leaving Certificate 29.17 40.83
Lower Secondary School 27.63 42.65
Intermediate Secondary School 38.37 62.41
Entrance Examination for University for 
Applied Sciences
44.09 81.88
High School Diploma 40.94 78.59
Without Professional Degree 19.46 27.06
Full-Time Vocational School 35.53 49.12
Apprenticeship 32.39 51.06
Master Craftman 43.93 78.50
University for Applied Sciences 46.40 86.72
University 41.04 85.66
Total 33.74 56.31
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Full-Time working males in percent. Number of Observations: 9800
In table 7, participation in internal and external training is described by the level of
education. For internal training, there is the clear trend visible that high-skilled workers
24Ceteris paribus, the wage eﬀect diﬀerences between employees with low and high experience and
between diﬀerent skill levels are signiﬁcant.
18participate more often (about 40 percent) than low-skilled workers (about 30 percent). In
the case of external training, this tendency is even much more obvious: While 86 percent
of employees with a university degree take part in external training, less than 30 percent
of the unskilled (without professional degree) participate.
Table A8 in the appendix shows the results of the simple OLS earnings equation
including internal and external training. The impact of external training is signiﬁcantly
positive, in contrast to internal training, which has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on earnings.25 The
coeﬃcients of the other variables in the extended income equation are as expected and
similar to those found in the previous regression using the training dummy.
Table 8: Extended Earnings Equation with Training - Corrected for
Selectivity by Instrumental Variable Regression
External Training 0.13 (1.95) * Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Internal Training -0.02 (-0.45)  Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.51) 
Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-0.67) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.01 (0.42)  Master/Foreman 0.13 (2.09) **
Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-1.99) ** Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.05 (0.95) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
-0.00 (-0.02) 
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.02 (0.72) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.11 (2.49) **
High School Diploma 0.06 (3.19) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.12 (2.32) **
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.21 (2.82) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.03 (-0.86)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.14 (2.93) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.11 (1.46) 
Apprenticeship -0.04 (-1.23)  Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.38 (2.95) ***
Master Craftman -0.01 (-0.15) 
University for Applied Sciences 0.05 (0.98) 
University 0.08 (1.53)  Computer Work Station 0.03 (3.18) ***
Temporary Work -0.06 (-2.63) ***
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (4.93) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (9.02) *** Overtime 0.03 (2.98) ***
Professional Experience 
Squared
-0.00 (-6.52) *** Profit-Sharing 0.05 (2.99) ***
Company Tenure 0.00 (2.83) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (2.82) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-0.98) 
Unemployment -0.03 (-2.61) *** Number of Observations 8325
F(337, 7987) 31,5
R-squared 0.5114
Children 0.06 (8.00) ***





Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
25This conﬁrms the stronger bivarate correlations between the four external training variables and earn-
ings in comparison to the three internal training variables, see table A5.
19Table 8 continued
Professional Experience 0.00 (0.62)  Professional Experience 0.01 (1.33) 
Professional Experience 
Squared 0.00 (1.00)  Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.98) **
Company Tenure -0.01 (-4.21) *** Company Tenure 0.00 (0.54) 
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (3.82) *** Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-0.27) 
Computer Work Station 0.02 (0.73)  Computer Work Station 0.01 (0.34) 
Temporary Work -0.04 (-0.77)  Temporary Work 0.01 (0.19) 
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (2.49) ** Good Economic Situation -0.04 (-1.38) 
Overtime -0.03 (-1.55)  Overtime 0.01 (0.30) 
Profit-Sharing 0.06 (2.44) ** Profit-Sharing -0.04 (-1.02) 
Incentive Wage -0.02 (-1.04)  Incentive Wage 0.01 (0.28) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.00 (0.07)  Without School Leaving Certificate -0.05 (-0.56) 
Lower Secondary School -0.00 (-0.12)  Lower Secondary School -0.06 (-2.18) **
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.02 (0.58) 
Entrance Examination for University 
for Applied Sciences 0.24 (0.55) 
High School Diploma 0.03 (0.85)  High School Diploma -0.02 (-0.38) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.04 (-0.53)  Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.02 (-0.34) 
Assistant Foreman -0.27 (-2.12) ** Assistant Foreman 0.10 (1.16) 
Master/Foreman 0.08 (0.64)  Master/Foreman -0.05 (-0.46) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.01 (0.14)  Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.67) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.09 (-0.86) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks 0.04 (0.4) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.06 (0.58) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks -0.11 (-1.44) 
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.08 (0.81)  High-Skilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.83) 
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.03 (0.22)  Executive White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.15) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.11 (0.97)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.27 (-2.88) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.01 (-0.11)  Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.01 (0.13) 
Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.13 (-0.97)  Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.00 (0.02) 
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Professional Status
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - Internal Training
School Attainment
Professional Status
Interaction Variables - External Training
Analogously to the analysis above, also in this speciﬁcation we have to take endogeneity
of training into account. Hence, we estimate a regression with instrumental variables for
the two training factors. Selection into the two types of training diﬀers, as can be seen
in the appendix (tables A9 and A10), where the regression equations of selection into
internal and external training are shown. The identifying variables “need for training”
and “restructuring” and their coeﬃcients as well as all other determinants of internal
and external training are reported in the tables. Participation in external training is
explained much better by the right hand side variables than participation in internal
training, as indicated by the adjusted R2 of 0.43 (0.17) for the estimation of participation
in external (internal) training. The identifying variables also vary slightly between internal
and external training. Restructuring of the workplace suggests involvement in either
kind of training. Likewise, if employees report a need for training in speciﬁct o p i c s ,t h i s
increases the probability that they have taken part in training before. The demand for
20training in mathematics reduces the probability of participation in internal as well as in
external training during the last two years. School attainment and professional experience
a r eo fn oi m p o r t a n c ei nd e t e r m i n i n gs e l e c t i o ni n t oi n t e r n a lt r a i n i n g ,w h i l et h e ya r es o m e
of the main determinants indicating participation in external training. Another crucial
determinant of internal training is ﬁrm size, which in contrast is no important determinant
of participation in external training. Likewise, Bartel (1995) ﬁnds an increasing training
incidence with length of services for core training, while the incidence of the other training
forms decreases signiﬁcantly. Lynch (1992) ﬁnds higher training incidence with experience
for company-provided training, while the incidence of oﬀ-the-job training decreases with
tenure in her estimation. Employees with temporary contracts are very unlikely to receive
either kind of training. Professional status and vocational training dummies determine
attendance in both types of training.
The results of the instrumental variable regression are given in table 8. The impact
of external training on earnings increases after correcting for the selection bias, while the
t-value decreases but nevertheless stays signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of participation in internal
training on earnings stays insigniﬁcant. The endogeneity correction therefore has the
same eﬀect on external training as in our ﬁrst model with training participation, i.e. the
results in the ﬁrst part are driven by the external training types. The coeﬃcients are not
directly comparable since we use a dummy (0,1-variable) ﬁrst, while later the training
factors range from -1 to +4 with mean zero, depending on how many diﬀerent training
types were attended. The coeﬃcients of the other explanatory variables in the extended
income equation including the two types of training do not deviate from the model with
the training dummy, and the adjusted R2 remains at 51 percent. Interaction terms of
internal training and the covariates and external training and covariates diﬀer. While
company tenure has a negative impact on the return to external training, it is insigniﬁcant
for internal training. In contrast, professional experience has a positive (but decreasing)
impact on returns to internal training, and the interaction terms of external training and
the experience variables are insigniﬁcant. If the ﬁrm is in a good economic situation,
participation in external but not in internal training induces a higher wage mark-up.
5 What does the literature ﬁnd?
The analysis above provides evidence for the hypothesis that heterogeneity of employees,
their workplaces, and training forms have to be taken into account when estimating the
individual returns to investment in continuous training. In order to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of the eﬀects of training, it is also important to look at the employer side and
the productivity eﬀects of training. The title by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000)
“Who gains when workers train?” suggests that the shares of the rent generated by train-
ing, that can be appropriated by employers and employees, can be measured. As they do
not have appropriate data combining the necessary information on employees and ﬁrms
21as well as training behavior, their evidence is more indirect, however. By comparing the
wage and the productivity eﬀects of training in diﬀerent economic sectors between 1983
and 1996 in the UK, they conclude that the increase in wages is less than half the increase
in value added per worker. A comparable result is obtained by Hempell (2003) using the
Mannheim Innovation Panel data for the German services sector in the period 1994-1998.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997) ﬁnd that the average return to formal training at a pre-
vious employer exceeds the return to past formal training at the current employer. This
strand of the literature therefore shows that the rent generated from training is distributed
between employer and employee. An exception is the result by Mincer (1991) who com-
pares the eﬀect of training on productivity with the eﬀect on income. In his analysis, the
impact of training on employee’s income is positive but negative on turnover. This implies
that the employees can reap the entire rent from training.
Several other papers report the productivity and wage eﬀects of training but do not
relate these eﬀects to rent sharing between the employees trained and the employer, see the
literature survey by Bartel (2000). We speciﬁcally look at both strands of the literature,
diﬀerentiating between training forms in order to evaluate how our results ﬁti n .
5.1 Literature Based on Individual Data
A summary of recent work on training with individual data is presented in table 9, men-
tioning the types of training used, estimation methods, and results. Studies diﬀerentiating
between diﬀerent types of training have used various deﬁnitions, depending on the data
they use. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997) did not ﬁnd any systematic diﬀerence in the
wage returns to general and speciﬁc training provided by the current employer. They
t r a c et h i sr e s u l tb a c kt om e a s u r e m e n te r r o ri nt r a i n i n ga n dt ot h ef a c tt h a tr e n ts h a r i n g
between employer and employee takes place for both kinds of training. Closest to our
deﬁnition of training forms is Lynch (1992). She uses on-the-job and oﬀ-the-job training
and analyzes U.S. data on young employees (National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort).
Additionally, she distinguishes whether training was received during previous or current
employment, and she has information on the duration of training spells. Her results dif-
fer from ours: she does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of training oﬀ-the-job during current
employment. The positive eﬀect of training on-the-job during current employment turns
insigniﬁcant when she uses the Heckman correction for sample selection. The latter result
is similar to our ﬁndings. The diﬀerences in the ﬁrst result might be due to the data she
uses, where only young people are included. Our results indicate that the positive wage
eﬀects of external training mainly accrue to more experienced and skilled employees. It
can be assumed that our internal training measures mainly take place during work hours,
while the external training variables take place during leisure time. Pischke (2001) there-
fore ﬁnds comparable results in a ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimation. Training during leisure
time has a positive impact on earnings growth, while training during work hours has no
eﬀect in his estimations.
22Table 9 Studies using Diﬀerent Training Types
Literature using Individual Data
Study Endogenous Variable Result: types of training in bold
Bartel (1995) wage growth
Career advancement*: OLS(+)** IV(0) 
Employee development: OLS(+) IV(++)
Blundell, Dearden and 
Meghir(1999)
wage and wage growth
Employer provided: OLS(+) IV(++)
Non-employer provided: OLS(0) IV(-)
Loewenstein and 
Spletzer (1998)
wage General: current job(+) previous job(++)
Specific: current job(+) previous job (0)
Lynch(1992) wage
Off-the-job: current job OLS(0) 
Heckman*** (0) previous job OLS(+)
On-the-job: current job OLS(+) 
Heckman(0) previous job OLS(0) 
Heckman (0)
Pfeiffer and Reize 
(2001)
earnings
Formal(+) Nonformal(+) Switching 
Regression Model
Pischke(2001) earnings growth
During Leisure Time(+) During Work 
Hours(0)
 fixed effects panel regression
Literature using Firm Data
Study Endogenous Variable Result: types of training in bold
Barrett and O'Connell 
(2001)
productivity growth General:OLS(+), Specific:OLS(0)
Black and Lynch (1996) sales
Percentage of Formal Training outside 
working hours in total training: OLS(+) 
Computer Training: OLS(+) Teamwork 
Training: OLS(0) Supervisor Training: 
OLS(0)
Black and Lynch (1997) labour productivity Several Training Measures: OLS(0)
Zwick (2002) value added
Formal Training: OLS(+) Fixed 
Effects(++) Training On-the-Job:OLS(-) 
Fixed Effects(0)
*Career advancement consists of core and technical training. **(+) positive effect (++) higher positive effect (-) 
negative effect (0) insignificant effect ***Heckman correction for sample selection.
5.2 Literature Based on Firm Data
Most papers on the productivity impact of training only look at the impact of a train-
ing dummy or the training intensity, while eﬀects of diﬀerent training measures are not
distinguished. Black and Lynch (1996) and Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) ﬁnd
that training oﬀ the job26 has a productivity eﬀect but not on-the-job training, and that
computer training is more eﬀective than teamwork training and supervisor training. The
authors conclude that the insigniﬁcant impact of internal training on productivity is ei-
ther due to the output loss since it reduces hours worked or that external training is more
advanced training which results in a stronger productivity increase of the participants.
Barrett and O’Connell (2001) show that general training signiﬁcantly increases productiv-
ity, while speciﬁc training has no impact on productivity. They argue that the employees
devote greater eﬀort to general training than to speciﬁc training because it is transferable
or regarded as a gift from the employer. A higher eﬀort leads to a better human capital
eﬀect of training and analogously to higher productivity. Zwick (2002) ﬁnds for Germany
that mainly formal internal and external training courses increase productivity, whereas
26In this case, on-the-job and oﬀ-the-job training refers rather to the formality of training than to the
location.
23self-induced learning, such as reading work-related literature or e-learning and quality cir-
cles, have lower but still signiﬁcant positive eﬀects. Training on the job, job rotation and
participation in trade fairs did not have positive productivity eﬀects. Again, it seems that
training measures with higher general contents have a stronger productivity eﬀect than
training measures with higher ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o n t e n t s .
6 Summary of Results
Our main results are:
1. The impact of participation in training on income is signiﬁcantly positive. Training
comprises any of the following: courses and seminars, participation in trade fairs,
lectures, on-the-job training, quality circles, special tasks, and reading of specialist
literature. Correcting for the endogeneity bias, the average treatment eﬀect increases
from 0.10 to 0.15.
2. The eﬀect of training on earnings diﬀers for heterogeneous agents. High-skilled
workers proﬁt more from training than low-skilled workers, job entrants obtain a
higher earnings increase after participation in training than workers with a long job
tenure, and workers with a temporary contract proﬁt less from training than those
with a permanent job contract. If also the workers with no positive wage eﬀects
experience a productivity increase induced by training, the employers reap all the
gains from training.
3. The increase in the income eﬀects of training if endogeneity is taken into account,
compared with the case where selection is assumed to be random, suggests that
our instrumental variables reduce the measurement error in the OLS regression and
capture heterogeneous training returns more properly. This is plausible because our
dummy variable for training inadequately captures training intensity and training
eﬀort. The third possibility for this phenomenon, a negative selection into training,
seems unlikely given previous empirical evidence that training is seldom remedial.
4. Without controlling for endogeneity, external training (i.e. participation at trade
fairs, lectures, courses and seminars, and reading of specialist literature) has a sig-
niﬁcant positive impact on wages, while the wage eﬀect of internal training (i.e. on
the job training, quality circles, and special tasks) is insigniﬁcant. Taking endogene-
ity into account and instrumenting the training decision, the coeﬃcient of external
training rises from 0.05 to 0.13, internal training stays insigniﬁcant. Hence, par-
ticipation in internal training does not translate into higher earnings. Here again,
only the employer seems to skim productivity increases from investments in human
capital (again assuming that employees’ productivity is increased by the training).
Therefore, only external training has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on earnings
and drives the result derived with a dummy for training participation.
245. Our contribution can only present indirect evidence on who gains when workers
train. We have been able to answer the question “who gains from training?” in
the sense of which type of employees proﬁts from higher wages after participation
in training. With our data, we were not able to present evidence for rent sharing
after investment in training between employer and employee. Nevertheless, using the
indirect information of income increases and assuming that productivity increases
after training, we can make inferences about whether also the employer proﬁts from
training. Possibly, employers reap all the gains from the internal training measures
analyzed in the second part of the paper. This is also suggested by the empirical
literature using ﬁrm data. In order to obtain clearer evidence, linked employer-
employee panel data with detailed information on type, length and cost of training
would be required, however.
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287A p p e n d i x
Table A1 List of Variables Used
Variable Share / Average Notes
Less than 600 DM 0.07%
Between 600 and 1000 DM 0.16%
Between 1000 and 1500 DM 0.56%
Between 1500 and 2000 DM 1.25%
Between 2000 and 2500 DM 4.31%
Between 2500 and 3000 DM 7.69%
Between 3000 and 3500 DM 11.87%
Between 3500 and 4000 DM 14.87%
Between 4000 and 4500 DM 14.48%
Between 4500 and 5000 DM 12.28%
Between 5000 and 5500 DM 7.59%
Between 5500 and 6000 DM 6.93%
Between 6000 and 7000 DM 7.58%
Between 7000 and 8000 DM 4.10%
Between 8000 and 9000 DM 2.52%
Between 9000 and 10000 DM 1.37%
Between 10000 and 15000 DM 1.73%
15000 DM and more 0.64%
Without School Leaving 
Certificate
2.51%
Lower Secondary School 51.23%
Intermediate Secondary School 24.75%
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences
7.60%
High School Diploma 13.91%
Without Professional Degree 12.63%
Full-Time Vocational School 2.22% Several years of professional training in school
Dual Apprenticeship 60.17% Several years of professional training in school and 
on the job
Master Craftman 11.34%
University of Applied Sciences 5.79%
University 7.85%
Courses and Seminars 26.72%
Trade Fair 18.09% Participation in trade fairs
Lecture 25.9% Participation in lectures
On-The-Job 16.70% Initial training on the job
Quality Circle 14.07% Participation in quality circles
Special Tasks 12.86% Tasks aiming at extending skills
Specialist Literature 26.11% Study of work-related literature
Professional Experience 22.69 years Years from first job until today
Company Tenure 13.86 years Years from starting to work for a company until today








Variable Share / Average Notes
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker 15.63% Worker without professional degree
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 27.18% Worker with degree from dual apprenticeship system 
or full-time vocational school
Assistant Foreman 3.60%
Master/Foreman 3.25%
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 2.22% White-Collar worker with basic tasks
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
3.98%






Executive White-Collar Worker 4.97%
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 4.55%
Civil Servant in Higher Service 3.93%
Civil Servant in Senior Service 2.07%
Computer Work Station 48.21% Work routine includes using the computer 
Temporary Work 4.87%
Good Economic Situation 59.04% Dummy = 1 if the company is in a good economic 
situation, otherwise 0
Overtime 78.34% Dummy = 1 if a person works overtime, otherwise 0
Profit-Sharing 7.94%
Incentive Wage2 1 . 6 2 %
Job Content 13 Categories: training, testing, counseling, 
supervising, repairing, procurement, organisiation, 
marketing, research, negotiating, developing, 
manufacturing, monitoring
Children 49.98% Dummy = 1 if a person has at least one child, 
otherwise 0
Foreigner 5.43% Dummy = 1 if a person does not have a German 
Nationality, otherwise 0
Demand for Specific Training 12 Categories: need for training in presentation 
techniques, foreign languages, logistics, 
Management, Controlling, Mathematics, German, 
System Engineering, Computer Engineering, Other 
Engineering, Safety at Work, Medicine
Changes in the Workplace 2 Categories: Downsizing, Restructuring
Size of Firm  7 Categories: number of employees is 1-4, 5-9, 10-
49, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999 and 1000 and above
Residence Community  3 Categories: communities with 50 000 and above 
inhabitants, hinterland of large cities and other 
communities with less than 50 000 inhabitants
Federal State  11 Categories: all Federal States of West Germany






30Table A2 Comparison: Interval Regression (INTREG) vs. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) - Estimates of the Extended Earnings Equation
INTREG OLS INTREG OLS
Professional 
Experience
0.01 (11.56) *** 0.01 (11.02) ***
Trade Fair 0.08 (9.95) *** 0.09 (9.86) ***
Professional 
Experience Squared
-0.00 (-7.76) *** -0.00 (-7.35) ***
Lecture 0.06 (7.13) *** 0.06 (6.99) *** Company Tenure 0.00 (10.43) *** 0.00 (9.88) ***
On-The-Job -0.03 (-3.95) *** -0.03 (-3.83) *** Unemployment -0.03 (-4.35) *** -0.03 (-4.17) ***
Quality Circle 0.03 (3.32) *** 0.26 (3.15) ***
Special Tasks 0.02 (2.18) ** 0.02 (2.14) **
Specialist Literature 0.06 (8.12) *** 0.06 (7.89) *** Computer Work 
Station
0.09 (12.41) *** 0.09 (11.97) ***
Temporary Work -0.07 (-4.42) *** -0.07 (-4.13) ***
Without School 
Leaving Certificate
-0.03 (-1.45)  -0.03 (-1.43)  Good Economic 
Situation
0.05 (6.47) *** 0.05 (6.21) ***
Lower Secondary 
School
-0.05 (-6.13) *** -0.05 (-6.11) *** Overtime 0.06 (8.09) *** 0.06 (8.00) ***
Intermediate 
Secondary School
Reference Reference Profit-Sharing 0.10 (7.92) *** 0.10 (7.76) ***
Entrance Examination 
for University for 
Applied Sciences
0.09 (6.64) *** 0.14 (5.57) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.71) *** 0.03 (3.62) ***
High School Diploma 0.11 (8.48) *** 0.11 (8.35) ***
Without Professional 
Degree




Apprenticeship -0.00 (-0.03)  -0.00 (-0.20)  Number of 
Observations
10003 10003
Master Craftman 0.08 (3.75) *** 0.08 (3.52) *** Chi-squared Stat. 8513.97
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.14 (5.83) *** 0.14 (5.57) *** R-squared 0.4691
University 0.27 (10.31) *** 0.27 (10.01) ***
Individual Characteristics
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), economic 
sector (46), demand for specific training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
*** (**, *) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values and z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
 Vocational Training 
Professional Career Education and Continuous Training
Training
Workplace Characteristics














Specialist Literature 0.41 0.49 1.00
On-The-Job 0.06 0.11 0.11 1.00
Quality Circle 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.16 1.00
Special Tasks 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.17 1.00
Courses and Seminars 0.26 0.50 0.36 0.12 0.28 0.24 1.00
Income 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.31 1.00
* correlations are all significant at 5 percent level  Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
31Table A4 Standard Earnings Equation & Extended Earnings Equation
including Diﬀerent Types of Training
log (Earnings)
Professional Experience 0.02 (17.50) *** 0.02 (15.56) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-11.52) *** -0.00 (-9.95) ***
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.07 (-2.77) *** -0.05 (-1.80) *
Lower Secondary School -0.10 (-10.84) *** -0.06 (-6.89) ***
Intermediate Secondary School
Entrance Examination for University 
for Applied Sciences
0.15 (8.05) *** 0.11 (6.36) ***
High School Diploma 0.17 (9.87) *** 0.14 (8.70) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.15 (-5.46) *** -0.12 (-4.53) ***
Full-Time Vocational School
Apprenticeship -0.00 (-0.15) -0.01 (-0.56)
Master Craftman 0.17 (6.12) *** 0.10 (3.64) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.22 (6.99) *** 0.14 (4.71) ***
University 0.33 (10.25) *** 0.25 (7.96) ***
Courses and Seminars 0.05 (5.80) ***
Trade Fair 0.10 (9.65) ***
Lecture 0.09 (8.62) ***
On-The-Job -0.01 (-0.92)
Quality Circle 0.07 (6.78) ***
Special Tasks 0.04 (4.20) ***
Specialist Literature 0.08 (8.04) ***
Number of Observations
F (11, 8313) / F (18, 8306)
R-squared


















***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses 
are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
32Table A5 Extended Earnings Equation with Control Variables - Diﬀerent
Types of Training included
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Courses and Seminars 0.00 (0.37)  Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (4.92) ***
Trade Fair 0.05 (4.86) *** Assistant Foreman 0.08 (4.15) ***
Lecture 0.04 (4.26) *** Master/Foreman 0.16 (6.61) ***
On-The-Job -0.01 (-1.54)  Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.06 (2.98) ***
Quality Circle 0.02 (2.06) **
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks
0.03 (1.56) 
Special Tasks 0.01 (0.76) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks
0.1 (6.29) ***




Executive White-Collar Worker 0.3 (12.22) ***
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.01 (-0.45)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.06 (2.52) **
Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-2.37) ** Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.14 (5.43) ***
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.3 (10.29) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences
0.05 (3.47) ***
High School Diploma 0.07 (4.81) ***
Computer Work Station 0.04 (4.41) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.06 (-2.30) ** Temporary Work -0.07 (-3.4) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Good Economic Situation 0.04 (5.21) ***
Apprenticeship -0.01 (-0.43)  Overtime 0.04 (5.49) ***
Master Craftman 0.03 (1.08)  Profit-Sharing 0.07 (5.11) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.09 (3.21) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.54) ***
University 0.19 (6.36) ***
Children 0.07 (9.58) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (8.92) *** Foreigner -0.04 (-2.33) **
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-6.49) ***
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.16) *** Number of Observations 8325
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.08) ** F(122, 8202) 71.57
Unemployment -0.03 (-3.75) *** R-squared 0.5021
Professional Status
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors).
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Education and Continuous Training
Training
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 






33Table A6 Extended Earnings Equation with Control Variables - Training
included as a Dummy
Training 0.05 (6.21) *** Computer Work 
Station
0.04 (5.06) ***
Temporary Work -0.06 (-3.31) ***
Without School 
Leaving Certificate





-0.03 (-3.38) *** Overtime 0.05 (6.26) ***
Intermediate 
Secondary School












-0.05 (-2.02) ** Children 0.07 (11.07) ***
Full-Time 
Vocational School
Reference Foreigners -0.04 (-2.62) ***
Apprenticeship -0.00 (-0.17) 





0.10 (3.79) *** F(111, 9891) 88.47












Unemployment -0.03 (-4.14) ***
Professional Career ***, (**,*) signals a level of 
significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-
values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own 
calculations.
Following control variables have 
been added: size of firm (6), federal 
state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for 
specific training (5), job contents (13) 
and a constant.
Education and Continuous Training Workplace Characteristics
School Attainment
Vocational Training Individual Characteristics
34Table A7 Extended Earnings Equation with Interaction Variables - Training
included as a Dummy and in Interaction Variables
Training 0.06 (6.54) *** Children 0.06 (6.03) ***
Foreigner -0.05 (-2.77) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.01 (0.24) 
Lower Secondary School -0.00 (-0.04) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Professional Experience 0.01 (1.90) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.03 (0.77)  Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-0.50) 
College Entrance Exam 0.08 (2.75) *** Company Tenure -0.01 (-2.48) **
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (1.35)
Without Professional Degree -0.07 (-1.78) * Computer Work Station 0.03 (1.45) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Temporary Work -0.05 (-1.36) 
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.44)  Good Economic Situation 0.02 (1.07) 
Master Craftman 0.02 (0.46)  Overtime -0.01 (-0.74) 
University for Applied Sciences 0.09 (1.49)  Profit-Sharing 0.02 (0.81) 
University 0.15 (2.68) *** Incentive Wage -0.04 (-2.75) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.04 (-0.85) 
Professional Experience 0.01 (4.85) *** Lower Secondary School -0.05 (-3.01) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-4.16) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.04 (1.04) 
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.23) *** High School Diploma 0.00 (0.16) 
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.26) **
Unemployment -0.02 (-1.80) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.02 (-0.68) 
Assistant Foreman -0.00 (-0.07) 
Master/Foreman 0.43 (0.79) 
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.04 (-0.98) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (4.36) *** White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.03 (-0.86) 
Assistant Foreman 0.07 (2.58) *** White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks -0.07 (-2.06) **
Master/Foreman 0.13 (2.76) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.70) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.09 (3.29) *** Executive White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.28) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
0.05 (2.02) ** Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.15 (-3.51) ***
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.16 (6.50) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.14 (-1.95) *
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.20 (7.60) *** Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.27 (-3.72) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.30 (6.43) ***
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.16 (4.68) *** Number of Observations 10003
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.23 (3.55) *** F(220, 9781)
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.55 (8.26) *** R-squared 0.5169
Computer Work Station 0.03 (1.82) *
Temporary Work -0.04 (-1.59) 
Good Economic Situation 0.03 (2.34) **
Overtime 0.05 (4.25) ***
Profit-Sharing 0.06 (2.41) **
Incentive Wage 0.05 (3.95) ***
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 






Workplace Characteristics ***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.




35Table A8 Extended Earnings Equation with Internal and External Training
External Training 0.05 (6.93) *** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Internal Training -0.01 (-1.75) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.04 (1.91) *
Assistant Foreman 0.04 (1.60) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate
-0.01 (-0.28)  Master/Foreman 0.13 (4.43) ***




White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks
0.00 (0.12) 
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.04 (2.21) **
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks
0.09 (4.03) ***




Executive White-Collar Worker 0.23 (7.39) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.07 (-2.11) ** Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.04 (1.52) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.12 (3.53) ***
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.88)  Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.32 (7.81) ***
Master Craftman 0.02 (0.62) 
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.07 (2.02) ** Workplace Characteristics
University 0.15 (4.27) *** Computer Work Station 0.04 (4.53) ***
Temporary Work -0.08 (-3.59) ***
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (5.02) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (9.39) *** Overtime 0.04 (4.79) ***
Professional Experience 
Squared
-0.00 (-6.70) *** Profit-Sharing 0.06 (4.33) ***
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.08) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.37) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.18) **
Unemployment -0.03 (-3.33) *** Number of Observations 8325
F(335, 7988)
R-squared 0.5245
Children 0.07 (9.43) ***















Company Tenure 0.00 (1.68) * Company Tenure -0.01 (-4.42) ***
Computer Work Station 0.00 (0.27)  Computer Work Station 0.01 (1.28) 
Temporary Work -0.00 (-0.14)  Temporary Work -0.04 (-1.40) 
Good Economic Situation -0.01 (-1.22)  Good Economic Situation 0.02 (2.10) **
Overtime -0.00 (-0.12)  Overtime -0.01 (-1.25) 
Profit-Sharing -0.00 (-0.38)  Profit-Sharing 0.01 (0.84) 
Incentive Wage 0.00 (0.02)  Incentive Wage -0.02 (-2.44) **
Without School Leaving 
Certificate
-0.01 (-0.28) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate
-0.01 (-0.43) 
Lower Secondary School -0.03 (-2.99) *** Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-1.73) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
-0.03 (-2.35) **
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.01 (0.88) 
High School Diploma -0.03 (-2.04) ** High School Diploma 0.02 (1.42) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.03 (-1.87) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.01 (-0.54) 
Assistant Foreman -0.00 (-0.14)  Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-1.38) 
Master/Foreman -0.02 (-0.89)  Master/Foreman 0.00 (0.06) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.00 (0.12)  Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.03 (-0.78) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks
-0.01 (-0.66) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks
-0.04 (-1.22) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks
-0.03 (-1.62) 











-0.07 (-2.69) *** Executive White-Collar Worker -0.00 (-0.06) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.03 (-1.40)  Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.10 (-3.27) ***
Civil Servant in Higher 
Service
-0.02 (-0.83)  Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.06 (-1.97) **
Civil Servant in Senior 
Service
-0.05 (-1.51)  Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.09 (-2.48) **
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - External Training
Professional Status Professional Status
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - Internal Training
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
37Table A9 Selection into Internal Training
Restructuring 0.24 (7.32) *** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.06 (2.03) **
Mathematics -0.12 (-2.21) ** Assistant Foreman 0.34 (5.29) ***
German 0.08 (1.23)  Master/Foreman 0.05 (0.84) 
System Engineering 0.13 (1.85) * Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.10 (-1.94) *
Computer Engineering 0.06 (1.32)  White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
-0.05 (-1.03) 
Other Engineering 0.26 (6.04) ***
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.11 (2.58) ***
Safety at Work 0.11 (2.77) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.07 (1.68) *
Medicine 0.13 (1.66) * Executive White-Collar Worker -0.10 (-1.76) *
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.22 (3.25) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.15 (2.05) **
School Attainment Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.02 (-0.19) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.03 (0.44) 
Lower Secondary School 0.00 (0.13) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Computer Work Station 0.20 (7.55) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences
-0.03 (-0.63)  Temporary Work -0.11 (-2.75) ***
High School Diploma -0.02 (-0.55)  Overtime 0.09 (4.31) ***
Incentive Wage 0.17 (6.45) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.03 (-0.47) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.33)  Foreigner -0.04 (-1.16) 
Master Craftman -0.06 (-0.85) 
University for Applied Sciences -0.08 (-0.94)  Number of Observations 9723
University -0.15 (-1.77) * F(102, 9620) 17.92
R-squared 0.1714
Professional Experience 0.00 (0.64)
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-2.51) **
Company Tenure 0.01 (-1.55)
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-1.59) 
Unemployment -0.00 (-0.20) 
Professional Career
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations




Education and Continuous Training
Vocational Training
38Table A10 Selection into External Training
Restructuring 0.07 (2.51) ** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (3.65) ***
Mathematics -0.13 (-2.77) *** Assistant Foreman 0.17 (3.69) ***
German -0.13 (-2.66) *** Master/Foreman 0.35 (6.04) ***
System Engineering 0.21 (3.62) *** Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.05 (1.31) 
Computer Engineering 0.17 (4.44) ***
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
0.04 (1.18) 
Other Engineering 0.19 (5.88) ***
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks
0.26 (8.02) ***
Safety at Work 0.15 (4.63) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.66 (18.96) ***
Medicine 0.10 (1.45)  Executive White-Collar Worker 0.72 (14.03) ***
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.23 (4.52) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.54 (8.35) ***
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.78 (9.78) ***
Without School Leaving  -0.05 (-1.10) 
Lower Secondary School -0.05 (-2.55) **
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Computer Work Station 0.19 (8.87) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.16 (4.08) *** Temporary Work -0.12 (-4.15) ***
High School Diploma 0.06 (1.57)  Overtime 0.11 (6.25) ***
Incentive Wage 0.03 (1.48) 
Without Professional Degree -0.02 (-0.42) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference
Apprenticeship 0.05 (0.91)  Foreigner -0.11 (-4.73) ***
Master Craftman 0.29 (4.96) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.31 (4.60) *** Number of Observations 9723
University 0.38 (5.24) *** F(112, 9610) 73.09
R-squared 0.4322
Professional Experience 0.01 (2.64) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-3.40) ***
Company Tenure 0.02 (6.69) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-4.70) ***
Unemployment -0.05 (-3.01) ***






Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)







without school leaving 
certificate
Ohne Abschluss
lower secondary school Hauptschule
intermediate secondary school
Realschule
entrance examination for 
university for applied sciences
Fachhochschulreife
high school diploma Abitur
without professional degree Ohne Ausbildung
full-time vocational school Berufsfachschule
apprenticeship Lehre
master craftsman Meister
university for applied sciences Fachhochschule
university Universität
unskilled blue-collar worker Angelernter Arbeiter
skilled blue-collar worker Facharbeiter
assistant foreman Vorarbeiter
master/foreman Meister
unskilled white-collar worker Ausführender Angestellter
white-collar worker with simple 
tasks
Angestellter mit einfacher Tätigkeit
white-collar worker with difficult 
tasks
Angestellter, der schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner 
Anweisung selbstständig erledigt
high-skilled white collar worker Angestellter, der selbstständige Leistungen in 
verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringt oder begrenzte 
Verantwortung für die Tätigkeit anderer trägt
executive white collar worker Angestellter mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und 
Entscheidungsbefugnissen
civil servant in clerical grade Beamter im einfachen oder mittleren Dienst
civil servant in higher service Beamter im gehobenen Dienst





40Figure A1 Participation in Training depending on Experience and Tenure
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